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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY v. 
DEPARTMENT OF WATER: THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT DISALLOWS FEDERAL COMMON 
LAW NUISANCE CLAIM FOR MONO LAKE 
WATER AND AIR POLLUTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In National Audubon Society v. Department of Water,! the 
Ninth Circuit held the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(FWPCA)2 preempted National Audubon Society's (Audubon's) 
federal common law nuisance action against the Los Angeles De-
partment of Water and Power (DWP) for polluting the water of 
California's Mono Lake. a The pollution, increased lake salinity 
and ion concentration, resulted from DWP's diversions of water 
from four feeder streams since 1940, according to Audubon." 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Audubon's federal common 
law nuisance claim for air pollution created by high winds com-
bined with alkali soil from the exposed lake bed. Ii The court did 
not decide whether the claim was preempted by the Clean Air 
Act because it found a federal common law nuisance air pollu-
tion action could not properly be asserted.s The Ninth Circuit 
1. 869 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1989) (per Brunetti, J.; other panel tnembers were Good-
win, J., and Reinhardt, J., dissenting in part). 
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). The FWPCA is commonly referred to as the Clean 
Water Act which was codified as an amendment to the FWPCA in 1977. See infra note 
126. 
3. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200. 
4. Id. at 1198-99. 
5. Id. at 1199. 
6. Id. at 1205. 
209 
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majority conceded there might be some limited federal interest 
in the nation's air quality,7 but determined that the claim must 
fail because neither the rights and obligations of the United 
States as sovereign were involved8 nor was there an interstate 
dispute that would make application of state law inappropriate.s 
Subsequent to this decision, the California Supreme Court 
rejected an appeal by DWP to review California Trout, Inc. v. 
State Water Resources Control Board,1° a state appellate court 
decision requiring California to recall and reissue DWP water 
diversion permits after conditioning them to provide sufficient 
streamflows for the fishery. Mono Lake benefits from this deci-
sion as decreased diversions will allow more water to flow into 
the lake.l1 
On September 22, 1989, Governor George Deukmejian 
signed two bills, known as the Environmental Water Act of 1989, 
designed to restore and preserve Mono Lake. Assembly Bill 
144212 created a $65 million Environmental Water Fund.13 As-
7. [d. at 1204. 
8. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1205. 
9. [d. A third issue on appeal was whether the district court, having obtained juris-
diction pursuant to removal (see 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1982)), abused its discretion by 
deciding to remand the state law claims after the defendants deleted the original basis 
for removal in an amendment intended to defeat federal court jurisdiction. National 
Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged remand orders are not con-
sidered final for appellate review (citing Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 
U.S. 336, (1976) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1987)), but the district court certified the deci-
sion, making the order discretionary and reviewable. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 
1205. The Ninth Circuit upheld the order based on the pendent jurisdiction doctrine, 
which supports giving a district court discretion to remand when the exercise of pendent 
jurisdiction is inappropriate. [d. 
10. 207 Cal. App. 3d 585, 255 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Jan. 1989) (water appropriation per-
mits must be conditioned for compliance with CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5937, mandat-
ing dam owners allow sufficient water flow for fishery below dam). National Audubon 
Society and the Mono Lake Committee joined Cal Trout as plaintiffs in this suit. 
11. In a separate state court action, El Dorado County Superior Court Judge Ter-
rence M. Finney, ordered Los Angeles to stop diverting water from Mono Lake until 
March 30, 1990, so the lake's water level could be raised approximately two feet. Audu-
bon and the Mono Lake Committee sought the preliminary injunction to stop the diver-
sions until the suit went to trial. The Napa Register, August 23, 1989, at 29, col.2. 
12. A.B. 1442, Reg. Sess., 1989. Assemblyman Bill Baker (D-Walnut Creek) spon-
sored the bill to amend section 11913 of the CAL. WATER CODE and to add sections 12303, 
12929.10, 12929.12, and 12929.13 relating to water resources. 
13. E. Robbins, Digest of Concurrence in Senate Amendments on A.B. 1442 at 2 
(Sept. 15, 1989) (available from offices of California Assemblyman Phillip Isenberg). 
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sembly Bill 44414 required as much as $60 million from the 
Water Fund to be spent to preserve Mono Lake. lli This legisla-
tion ensures Mono Lake permanent protection by reducing the 
amount of diverted water.I8 
II. FACTS 
Mono Lake, located in central California, east of Yosemite 
National Park, is the state's second largest natural body of 
water.17 Since 1940, the Los Angeles DWP has diverted water 
from four freshwater streams that normally flow into the lake.I8 
The diversions occurred pursuant to permits issued by the Cali-
fornia Water Resources Control Board.I9 As a result of the low-
ered water volume, over 14,700 acres of lake bed have been 
exposed.20 The lake has increased in salinity21 because of the 
freshwater diversions, threatening bird and shrimp popu-
lations.22 
14. Assemblyman Phillip Isenberg (D-Sacramento) authored the bill to add Chapter 
7.7 (codified as §§ 12929-12929.47) to the CAL. WATER CODE. 
15. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 12929-12929.47 (West Supp. 1990). Together, DWP and 
the Mono Lake Committee may request grants to fund alternative water and power sup-
plies for Los Angeles. [d. at 12929.22. 
16. The legislation also states that it does not affect the rights or obligations of any 
party involved in Mono Lake Basin litigation. CAL. WATER CODE § 12929.25. 
17. Appellant's Opening Brief at 4, National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of 
Water, 869 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 85-2046). The lake is a natural saline lake that 
supports an abundant population of brine shrimp that feed a very large number of nest-
ing and migratory birds. [d. The shrimp are commercially harvested by local industry. 
[d. Mono Lake is also a major tourist attraction. [d. Annually, more than a million peo-
ple visit the lake to enjoy its scenic beauty, to recreate, and to use it for the scientific 
study of wildlife and geologic formations. [d. 
18. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1198. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. Additionally, the exposed Lake bed is composed of fine-grained silt, clay, and 
volcanic glass particles. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5. The particles contain various 
soluble alkali chemicals that have precipitated out of the lake. [d. This material is 
whipped by high winds, creating dust storms (fugitive dust) that degrade the area's pris-
tine air quality and extend to nearby federally owned lands and the state of Nevada. [d. 
21. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 
Cal. Rptr. 346, (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413 (1983). Mono Lake has no outlets. It 
loses water only by evaporation and seepage. Natural salts do not evaporate with water, 
but are left behind. Prior to DWP diversions, the natural salinity was balanced by a 
continuous supply of fresh stream water. Due to the diversions, there is an imbalance 
between inflow and outflow that diminishes the lake's size and increases its salinity. [d. 
22. Appellant's Opening Brief at 4. 
3
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In 1979, Audubon and others~3 filed an action in Mono 
County Superior Court against DWP, seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief.24 The parties asserted several causes of action: 
violation of the public trust,21i violation of CAL. CONST. art. XVI, 
section 6,26 a quiet title action to establish public trust rights in 
the waters of Mono Basin,27 public and private nuisance (from 
mud and dust created by reliction),28 and violation of CAL. 
CONST. art. X, section 4.29 
DWP cross-complained against the State of California and 
several federal agencies. so The United States removed the action 
23. Other parties included Friends of the Earth, Mono Lake Committee, Los Ange-
les Audubon Society, David Gaines, Charles K. Simis, Walter Hansen, and John Boyn-
ton. National Audubon, 869 F.2d 1196. 
24. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1198-99. 
25. [d. California acquired title, as trustee for the public, of all navigable waterways 
and the lands lying beneath them when it was admitted to the union. The state has both 
the sovereign power and the duty to exercise continued supervision over the trust. City 
of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 363, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980) 
(quiet title action brought against City of Berkeley and State of California) cert denied, 
449 U.S. 840 (1980). See also National Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 433-41, 658 P. 2d 
709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346. Parties acquiring rights in trust property usually hold them sub-
ject to the trust and can assert no vested right to use them in a manner harmful to the 
trust. [d. 
26. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1198-99. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 prohibits a 
gift by the state of a state asset. It provides, in relevant part: "The Legislature shall have 
no power ... to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money 
or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever .... " 
27. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1198-99. 
28. [d. 
29. [d. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 prohibits the obstruction of navigable waters. It 
provides: 
No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or pos-
sessing the frontage or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estu-
ary, or other navigable water in this State, shall be permitted 
to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is re-
quired for any public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the 
free navigation of such water; and the Legislature shall enact 
such laws as will give the most liberal construction to this pro-
vision, so that access to the navigable waters of this State shall 
be always attainable for the people thereof. 
30. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1199. Before DWP filed its four count cross-
complaint, the case was transferred to Alpine County Superior Court. [d. The cross-
complaint's first count sought adjudication of Basin water rights as to all appropriators; 
the second sought to quiet title to those rights. [d. The two counts named 117 cross-
defendants, including all of the plaintiffs, the State of California, the United States For-
est Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and numerous private water users. [d. The 
third cause of action requested the court declare that "to the extent that the United 
States has jurisdiction over California's exercise of its navigation trust, Congress has con-
sented to the impairment of the navigable waters of Mono Lake." [d. Finally, DWP 
4
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to federal district court.31 In order to facilitate remand of the 
state claims, DWP sought to amend its cross-complaint to delete 
the federal claim on which the district court found removal 
proper.32 Alternatively, DWP asked the court to abstain.33 
Audubon sought permission to amend its complaint to in-
clude a federal common law nuisance cause of action.34 The or-
ganization claimed the lake is an "interstate or navigable" water 
in which there is an overriding federal interest,31i and that the 
diversions lower the lake volume, causing water36 and air 
pollution.87 
sought a declaration that conditions at the lake resulted from California's exercise of its 
police power, claiming that any nuisance at Mono Lake is attributable to the owner of 
the newly exposed lake bed. Id. 
31. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1199. Removal was sought by the United States 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442{a)(I), on the grounds that the cross-complaint named fed-
eral agencies. Id. DWP moved to remand but the district court denied the motion. Na-
tional Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water, 496 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Cal. 1980). 
32. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1199. 
33. Id. Abstention occurs when a federal court refers state-law questions to state 
court instead of deciding the question itself. Abstention is recognized: (I) to avoid deci-
sion of a federal constitutional question where the case may be disposed of on questions 
of state law; (2) to avoid needless conflict with a state's administration of its own affairs; 
(3) to leave to the states the resolution of unsettled questions of state law; and (4) to 
ease the congestion of the federal court docket. These various doctrines overlap at times, 
and the courts have not always distinguished them clearly. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE 
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 52 (4th ed. 1983) [hereinafter WRIGHT]. 
34. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1199. 
35. Id. The lake is east of Yosemite National Park and much of the surrounding 
area is federally owned. Appellant's Opening Brief at 12. Also, the lake has been continu-
ously used in interstate commerce. Id. Audubon also relied on Illinois v. City of Milwau-
kee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) in which the Supreme Court stated federal common law to abate 
a public nuisance in "interstate or navigable waters" is appropriate. Id. at 16 {emphasis 
in Audubon's brieO. Also, see infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text. 
36. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1199. Audubon maintained that if the diversions 
continued, the increasing salts in the lake would destroy the brine shrimp and make the 
water intolerable for waterfowl. Appellant's Opening Brief at 13. The organization ar-
gued that the CW A did not apply because the diversions were not subject to a federal 
permit nor did the CW A regulate pollution such as creation of a saline environment by 
the withholding of fresh water. Id. at 11-12. Further, CWA regulation of salt water intru-
sion was inapplicable because that is the "invasion of a body of fresh water by a body of 
salt water." Id. at 24 {citing Glossary, Water and Waste Water Control Engineering at 
319 (3d ed. 1980». 
37. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1199. Audubon alleged that the strong winds 
blowing in the Mono Basin carry dust particles thousands of feet high and miles away, 
reducing visibility and air quality and threaten interstate public health. Appellant's 
Opening Brief at 14. Audubon also alleged that the Great Basin Unified Air Pollution 
Control District, which has jurisdiction over the Mono Basin, reported violations of na-
tional primary and secondary ambient air quality standards for particulates. Id. Also 
alleged was that the District expressed concern for violation of sulphate standards from 
5
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The district court granted both parties' motions.38 Thereaf-
ter, the district court determined abstention would be appropri-
ate.39 The court ordered Audubon to file a state court action to 
determine the relationship between the public trust doctrine 
and California's water rights system40 and establish whether ex-
haustion of administrative remedies was a prerequisite to Audu-
bon's suit" l 
After the state issues were resolved the parties returned to 
district court.42 DWP, joined by the State of California, filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment directed against Audu-
bon's federal nuisance claims43 and renewed its motion for re-
mand to state court. H 
The district court granted in part and denied in part DWP's 
summary judgment motion.4!! The court held Audubon could 
state a federal common law nuisance claim for air pollution,46 
that the Clean Air Act (CAA) did not preempt the claim.47 How-
ever, the court disallowed the water pollution claim, finding the 
FWPCA preempted it.48 
precipitation of sulphates in the receding lake's water as sulphates pose a known health 
hazard. [d. Audubon's brief further alleged that alkaline salt crystals are released as the 
lake recedes and they have been found to be harmful to humans and animals. [d. 
38. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1199. 
39. [d. 
40. [d. 
41. [d. The court retained jurisdiction over the case during the pendency of the 
state claim. [d. The state supreme court eventually reviewed the state action. The court 
held the public trust doctrine was not subsumed in the state water rights system. Fur-
thermore, the court held that Audubon was not required to exhaust administrative reme-
dies before the State Water Resources Control Board prior to filing suit. National Audu-
bon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, (1983), 
cert. denied sub nom. Los Angeles Dep't of Water v. National Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 
977 (1983). The court construed CAL. WATER CODE § 2501 (West 1971) to allow persons 
claiming that a use of water harmed the public trust, to seek a Water Board determina-
tion (including reconsideration of previously granted rights) of the water allocation. 
However, claimants need not seek the remedy from the Water Board because the state 
supreme court held the courts share concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board. [d. 
42. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1199. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. DWP filed the second motion to remand because, if the court granted its 
motion for partial summary judgment, no federal issue would remain to be decided. [d. 
45. [d. at 1199-1200. 
46. [d. at 1200. 
47. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200. 
48. [d. In addition, the court granted the motion to remand the state law claims. [d. 
Consequently, the district court retained jurisdiction over the federal nuisance claim for 
6
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In 1984, the district court certified the following questions 
for interlocutory appeal:49 whether the federal common law nui-
sance doctrine applies as a basis for restraining the water diver-
sions;lIo assuming it does, whether it can be asserted in this 
case;lIl and finally, whether the district court, having obtained 
jurisdiction pursuant to the removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 
1442(a)(1)), has discretion to remand this action to state court 
after DWP deleted the original basis for removal in an amend-
ment intended to defeat federal court jurisdiction.1I2 
On May 7, 1985, the district court issued a declaratory judg-
mentll3 holding federal common law nuisance applied to state-
authorized water diversions that cause potential air quality im-
pacts but not potential water quality impacts.1I4 California and 
Audubon appealed the judgment.1I1I Audubon, California, and 
DWP appealed the questions certified for interlocutory appeal. 1I8 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE CASE LAW 
1. Federal Common Law 
Justice Brandeis, writing for the majority in Erie v. 
Tompkins,1I7 observed that "general" federal common law does 
not exist. In Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek 
Ditch CO.,IIS decided on the same day, the Supreme Court ac-
dust pollution. [d. 
49. [d. Two of the questions, dealing with whether Audubon could maintain an ac-
tion for federal common law nuisance to restrain DWP's water diversions, were certified 
at the request of the State of California. Appellant's Opening Brief at 9. The third ques-
tion, certified at Audubon's request, asked whether the court below, having properly ob-
tained jurisdiction after the United States' removal, had discretion to remand the case to 
the state court. [d. 
50. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200. 
51. [d. 
52. [d. 
53. [d. The district court issued an order for declaratory judgment pursuant to FED. 
R. CIV. P. 54(b). National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200. 
54. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200. 
55. [d. 
56. [d. 
57. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts in diversity actions must apply state-created 
substantive law). 
58. 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (apportionment of La Plata River, an interstate stream, held 
to be a matter of federal common law). 
7
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knowledged that narrow areas remained where federal common 
law may be created to protect a federal interest.1I9 Federal com-
mon law is appropriate even though the Constitution or an act 
of Congress has not provided specific guidance.6o When disputes 
arise between two states, for example, the holding in Hinder-
lider indicates it is inappropriate for the court to apply one 
state's law over that of another. 
Federal common law survived the Erie ruling, as the Hin-
derlider decision verifies,6! although many questions remained 
about the situations in which federal law would continue to be 
applied.62 In two cases prior to Erie, the Supreme Court applied 
federal common law to address interstate pollution.6s However, 
59. [d. at 110. "For whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned 
between the two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the 
statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive." [d. 
60. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 315 U.S. 447 
(1943) ("no consideration" defense not available to accommodation note maker in suit by 
federal agency as note assignee). Justice Jackson, in an oft-quoted concurring opinion 
wrote: 
A federal court sitting in a non-diversity case such as this 
does not sit as a local tribunal. In some cases it may see fit for 
special reasons to give the law of a particular state highly per-
suasive or even controlling effect, but in the last analysis its 
decision turns upon the law of the United States, not that of 
any state. Federal law is no juridical chameleon changing com-
plexion to match that of each state wherein lawsuits happen to 
be commenced because of the accidents of service of process 
and of the application of the venue statutes. It is found in the 
federal Constitution, statutes, or common law. Federal com-
mon law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, 
and is conditioned by them. Within these limits, federal courts 
are free to apply the traditional common-law technique of de-
cision and to draw upon sources of the common law in cases 
such as the present. 
[d. at 471-72 (citation omitted). 
61. See WRIGHT, § 60, at 386-97. See supra note 33. After Hinderlider, several cases 
applied federal common law in very specific areas where there was strong federal interest 
and a need for uniform policy. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 
(1964) (federal common law applicable to United States foreign relations); Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (right of the government to control issu-
ance of commercial paper). Also, in the area of maritime law, federal common law has 
been consistently applied pursuant to U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, which provides that judi-
cial power shall extend to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. See WRIGHT. § 
60, at 391. 
62. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) in which the 
Court articulated that federal common law may be applied, "[i]n the absence of an appli-
cable Act of Congress .... " [d. 
63. In Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906), the State of Missouri brought suit to 
8
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not until 33 years after Erie did a federal court, in Texas u. 
Pankey,S" clearly invoke the federal common law nuisance doc-
trine for a public nuisance claim.slI The Tenth Circuit's holding 
in Pankey followed the Supreme Court's rationale in Georgia u. 
Tennessee Copper Co.ss in finding that interstate pollution 
should be a federal common law matter.S7 The United States Su-
preme Court shortly thereafter addressed the vitality of a fed-
eral common law nuisance doctrine. 
In Illinois u. City of Milwaukee,s8 (Milwaukee 1), Illinois 
sought to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction 
against Milwaukee for discharging raw or inadequately treated 
sewage into interstate waters.S9 The Court refused to exercise 
original jurisdiction, finding the district court had jurisdiction to 
resolve the matter because the dispute arose under federal law 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.70 The Court cited Pankey as the 
restrain Chicago's sewage discharge into the Desplaines River. Missouri alleged the dis· 
charge would eventually contaminate the source of its drinking water (the Mississippi 
River). [d. at 517. In the second case, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 
(1907), the State of Georgia sought to enjoin the copper company from discharging nox-
ious gas from their Tennessee plant. Georgia alleged the gas would, among other things, 
destroy its forest, orchards, and crops. [d. at 236. 
64. 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971) (Texas alleged New Mexico agricultural pesticides 
were polluting state waters). 
65. [d. at 236. Public nuisance is, by definition, broader than private nuisance. It is 
"the doing of or the failure to do something that injuriously affects the safety, health or 
morals of the public, or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury to 
the public." W. PAGE KEETON, D.B. DOBBS, R.E. KEETON, D.G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEA-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 90 n.2 (citation omitted) (5th ed. 1984). 
66. 206 U.S. 230. The Court noted that Georgia, in its capacity of quasi-sovereign, 
"has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and 
air within its domain." [d. at 237. 
67. Pankey, 441 F.2d at 240. The Tenth Circuit found, "[f)ederal common law and 
not [state) law [is) entitled and necessary to be recognized as a basis for dealing in uni-
form standards with the environmental rights of a State against improper impairment by 
sources outside its domain." [d. at 241. The court also noted that federal common law is 
sufficient to deal with "alleged federal rights" until the field "is regulated by comprehen-
sive legislation or authorized administrative standards." [d. 
68. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). Illinois maintained the Court had original jurisdiction pursu-
ant to U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. cl. 2, which provides: "in all Cases ... in which a State 
shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction." [d. Also, 28 U.S.C. § 
1251 (1982) provides that "(a) the Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive juris-
diction of: (1) All controversies between two or more States." Illinois u. Milwaukee, 406 
U.S. at 93. 
69. [d. at 99-100. 
70. [d. at 99. The Court determined that the question was "whether pollution of 
interstate or navigable waters creates actions arising under the 'laws' of the United 
States within the meaning of § 1331(a)." [d. The Court held that it did and that § 
9
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controlling principle with regard to whether pollution of inter-
state or navigable waters created a federal common law action. 
In Milwaukee I, the Court observed that federal common 
law applied to air and water in their ambient or interstate as-
pects.71 The Court noted several statutes72 indicative of Con-
gress's concern for interstate water quality, including the 
FWPCA.78 The Court found the remedy Illinois sought, abate-
ment of the public nuisance,74 was not within the "precise 
scope" of available remedies.711 Further, statutory remedies were 
not the sole federal remedies available to address pollution.76 
The Court acknowledged federal laws and regulations may 
eventually preempt the field of federal common law nuisance.77 
However, until statutory preemption occurs, federal courts have 
the power to hear federal common law nuisance suits.78 
The scope of the federal common law nuisance doctrine re-
mained uncertain after Milwaukee I. In Committee for the Con-
sideration of the Jones Falls Sewerage System v. Train79 (Jones 
1331(a) included suits brought by a state. Id. As reviewed by the Court in Milwaukee I, 
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) provided that, "[t)he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, 
exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States." The current version of the statute provides, "[t)he district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or trea-
ties of the United States." (Current version codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)). 
71. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 103. Douglas, J., writing for the majority noted, "When 
we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal com-
mon law." Id. 
72. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 101. The other statutes referenced include the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-70 (1982)), the Fish and 
Wildlife Act of 1956 (16 U.S.C. § 742a), the Act of September 22, 1959 (16 U.S.C. § 760e) 
and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (16 U.s.C. § 661). Id. at 101-02. 
73. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). 
74. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 93. 
75. Id. at 103. The Court did not indicate why the FWPCA did not provide this 
remedy. It merely observed that the FWPCA's abatement procedure followed a "long 
drawn-out procedure." Id. 
76. Id. "It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal 
rights are concerned." Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 103 (citing Textile Workers Union of 
America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (federal common law is 
remedy for labor-management contracts falling under § 301(a) of the Labor Management 
Relations Act of 1947)). 
77. Id. at 107. 
78.Id. 
79. 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976) (federal common law precluded as compliance with 
10
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Falls), the Fourth Circuit found that interstate pollution was a 
necessary prerequisite for a successful federal common law nui-
sance claim.so However, the Seventh Circuit in Illinois u. Out-
board Marine Corp.,SI determined that Milwaukee I did not re-
quire interstate effects.S2 
The court in Jones Falls also held that federal common law 
nuisance actions were not available to private parties.s3 The 
Third Circuit, however, in National Sea Clammers Association 
u. City of New York,s. found public nuisance actions available to 
private parties.slI 
In 1972, Congress amended the FWPCA.s6 After Milwaukee 
I, Supreme Court decisions initially focused on the interpreta-
tion of the 1972 amendments, not on whether the FWPCA pre-
empted federal common law.s7 Other federal courts, however, 
continued to address preemption issues. In 1979, the Ninth Cir-
the FWPCA 1972 Amendments). 
80. See also Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492 
(8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (federal common law nuisance inapplicable where no interstate 
pollution) modified sub nom. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 543 F.2d 1210 (8th 
Cir. 1976). 
81. 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980) (Illinois sought federal common law nuisance rem-
edy against in-state industrial polluter of Lake Michigan) vacated and remanded on 
other grounds, 453 U.S. 917 (1981). 
82. Outboard Marine, 619 F.2d at 628. 
83. Jones Falls, 539 F.2d at 1006. See also Township of Long Beach v. City of New 
York, 445 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1978) (relief under federal common law nuisance action 
should not be extended to private persons); Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275 
(D. Conn. 1976) (federal common law nuisance for water pollution does not provide basis 
for invoking federal jurisdiction for damages action brought by private plaintiffs) aff'd, 
573 F.2d 1289 (1st Cir. 1977). 
84. 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980) (class action against government officials for ocean 
pollution) rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Na-
tional Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1980); see infra notes 95-98 and accompanying 
text. 
85. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 616 F.2d at 1233. 
86. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 
(1982)). The 1972 amendments are commonly called the Clean Water Act. The amend-
ments established a regulatory system making waste discharges into national waters ille-
gal without a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. See 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1311 & 1342. All discharge points are regulated by the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 
1311(e). "Point source" is defined as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance 
... from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. 1362(14). 
87. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rei. State Water Re-
sources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976) (permit not required for federal facilities dis-
charging pollution); Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (EPA Administrator 
cannot allot states less than authorized federal financial assistance). 
11
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cuit ruled88 that the CAA did not preempt a federal common law 
nuisance action.89 Earlier that year the Seventh Circuit, in Illi-
nois v. City of Milwaukee90 ruled the FWPCA, even after the 
1972 amendments, did not preempt federal common law nui-
sance claims.91 
2. Federal Common Law Nuisance for Water Pollution 
Eliminated 
In Milwaukee v. Illinois8S (Milwaukee 11), the Supreme 
Court disallowed a federal common law nuisance action as a 
remedy for interstate water pollution.98 The Court stressed that 
Congress intended to establish, by enacting the 1972 amend-
ments, an all-encompassing regulatory program for water 
pollution.9• 
Less than two months after Milwaukee II, the Supreme 
Court ruled9 1! that the FWPCA and the Marine Protection, Re-
88. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 
1979) (federal common law nuisance action by California against Nevada to enjoin the 
development of a hotel-casino). 
89. Id. at 193. 
90. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979). Illinois filed this suit after the Court in Milwaukee 
I ruled the district court was the proper forum for Illinois to seek abatement of Milwau-
kee's sewage discharges. See Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91. The district court found the 1972 
FWPCA amendments did not preclude federal common law nuisance. Illinois v. City of 
Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298, 300 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Milwaukee appealed the district 
court's holding to the Seventh Circuit. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 155. 
91. Id. at 162-64. 
92. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). This case culminated the decade-long battle between Illi-
nois and Milwaukee over Milwaukee's sewage discharges into Lake Michigan. The Sev-
enth Circuit's decision that the 1972 FWPCA amendments had not preempted Illinois's 
federal common law nuisance claims was overturned because Wisconsin was discharging 
pursuant to a NPDES permit. Id. at 308-12. 
93. Id. at 317. However, this ruling seems to be fact specific: "We conclude that, at 
least so far as concerns the claims of respondents . ... " Id. at 317 (emphasis added); 
and " ... no federal common-law remedy was available to respondents in this case." Id. 
at 332 (emphasis added). 
94. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 318. The Court determined, "Every point source dis-
charge is prohibited unless covered by a permit, which directly subjects the discharger to 
the. administrative apparatus established by Congress to achieve its goals. The 'major 
purpose' of the Amendments was 'to establish a comprehensive long-range policy for the 
elimination of water pollution.' S. REP. No. 92-414, at 95, 2 Leg. Hist. 1511." (emphasis 
supplied). Id. 
95. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 
(1980). See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
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search and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA)96 preempted a 
federal common law nuisance claim for water pollution in coastal 
waters.97 The Court followed the rationale enunciated in Mil-
waukee II.98 
3. Preemption of Air Pollution Common Law Nuisance Claims 
Since Milwaukee I, the Supreme Court has not addressed 
federal common law nuisance for air pollution or whether the 
Clean Air Act99 preempts such an action. However, in New Eng-
land Legal Foundation v. Costle/oo the Second Circuit distin-
guished the CAA from the FWPCA finding a federal common 
law nuisance doctrine based on air pollution still existed. The 
court found it significantlOI that the CW A regulated all point 
sources of water pollution;102 whereas the CAA failed to regulate 
air pollution from every source. lOS 
The district court in United States v. Kin-Buc l04 also rea-
soned that similarities between the two acts did not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that the CAA preempted a federal com-
mon law nuisance action. 1011 The district court juxtaposed the 
case's facts against the Act's provisions and noted the CAA cre-
ated a complete regulatory procedure: various pollutants had 
96. 33 U.S.C. § 1401-45 (1982). 
97. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 22 (1980). 
98. [d. The Court concluded MPRSA was as comprehensive as the 1972 FWPCA 
amendments considered in Milwaukee II. [d. 
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982). 
100. 666 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1981). 
101. [d. at 32 n.2. 
102. [d. The Second Circuit noted that the Court in Milwaukee II also found this 
point significant. [d. 
103. [d. "[Milwaukee II}, found it especially significant that under the [CWA) the 
EPA regulated every point source of water pollution. [citations omitted] Under the 
[CAA], in contrast, the states and the EPA are not required to control efHuents from 
every source, but only from those sources which are found by the states and the agency 
to threaten national ambient air quality standards. [citations omitted]." [d. 
104. 532 F. Supp. 699 (D. N.J. 1982) (United States sought preliminary and injunc-
tive relief and penalties for FWPCA violations and damages under common law nuisance 
for air and water pollution). 
105. [d. at 701. "While the [CWA] regulates every point source of water pollution, 
the CAA regulates only those stationary sources of air pollution that are found to 
threaten national ambient air quality standards." [d. The court in Kin-Buc found the 
CAA must be evaluated on its own terms; the proper test is whether the act applied to a 
previously unregulated area. [d. at 701-02. 
13
Saxon: Environmental Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1990
222 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:209 
been identified, air quality standards set, and enforcement pro-
cedures implemented. lo6 As the CAA addressed the particular is-
sue under review, the court found it preempted a federal com-
mon law nuisance action under these circumstances.lo7 
B. STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Congress designed the FWPCA and the CAA with national 
interests in mind. lo8 Each act gives the EPA authority to admin-
ister and enforce its mandates. lo9 Each act also provides for citi-
zen enforcement.llo Despite similarities of purpose, the process 
differs in the manner in which each act achieves national protec-
tion of air and water.lll 
1. Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Congress enacted the FWPCA in 1948 to address national 
water quality concerns.ll2 In 1972, Congress amended the 
FWPCA, establishing a comprehensive regulatory program.1l3 
The amendments created a permit program (National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System - referred to as "NPDES")114 to 
regulate waste discharges. lUi A NPDES permit is required for 
every pollutant1l6 discharged from every point source,117 thus 
106. [d. at 702. 
107. [d. See also Reeger v. Mill Service, 593 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Pa. 1984) "[w)e find 
the regulatory scheme under the [CAA) to be similar to that of the acts considered in 
Sea Clammers, and ... apply the &dme principle of preemption." [d. 
108. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) for Congressional intent. 
109. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d). Examples of EPA authority to administer CAA are: 42 
U.S.C. § 7408(a) (EPA issues air quality criteria); 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (EPA administers 
preparation of, reviews, and approves state implementation plans setting forth air qual-
ity standards); and 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (federal enforcement procedures). 
110. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 and 42 U.S.C. § 7604. 
111. See infra notes 113-55 and accompanying text. 
112. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 
(1948) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). 
113. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 
§ 2, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). 
114. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). 
115. [d. at § 1342(a). 
116. [d. at § 1362(19). This section defines "pollution" as the "man-made or man-
induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of 
water." [d. 
117. [d. § 1311(e). Point sources are defined as "any discernible, confined and dis-
crete conveyance from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
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forcing compliance with effluent limitations. Any unpermitted 
discharge is illegal. 118 
The permitting authority (the EPA or an EPA-approved 
state agency)119 reviews the NPDES permit application and con-
ditions it for compliance with FWPCA standards, setting forth 
specific effluent limitations.12o The Act requires the discharger to 
submit monitoring data for review by the permit-granting au-
thority.l2l The agency conducts additional monitoring through a 
sampling program.122 
Section 208 of the FWPCA also addresses non-point sources 
of water pollution.123 Section 208 requires states to prepare ba-
sin or area-wide waste treatment management plans for areas 
where water quality problems exist or are anticipated.124 Non-
point source pollution includes urban drainage, mining run-off, 
agricultural and silviculture runoff, as well as "salt water intru-
sion resulting from reductions of fresh water flow from any 
cause, including ... diversion[s]."121i 
In 1977, Congress further amended the FWPCA.126 The 
Clean Water Act (CWA) added section 101(g), which expressly 
prohibits the FWPCA from interfering with state water alloca-
Discharges include "any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, 
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation or vessel or other floating 
craft." [d. This definition excludes agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows, 
dams and reservoirs. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
(EPA Administrator did not violate her discretionary duty by failing to regulate dis-
charge of pollutants from dams under a NPDES permit). Courts have, however, inter-
preted "point source" broadly. See United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368 
(10th Cir. 1979) (leachate discharged from reserve sump due to construction flaws or 
inadequate size were "point source" discharges). 
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 
119. [d. at § 1342(b). 
120. [d. at § 1342. 
121. [d. at §§ 1314(i) and 1318. 
122. [d. at § 1342(b)(2)(B). 
123. 33 U.S.C. § 1288. 
124. [d. 
125. [d. at § 1314(0. In 1987, the Act was amended to include section 319, further 
addressing non-point source water pollution. Federal Water Pollution Control Act as 
amended by Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, Stat. 7 (approved Feb. 4, 
1987) (section 319 codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1982)). 
126. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified at 33 
U.S.c. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)). 
15
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tions. lll? Further, section 102(d)128 of the CWA requires that the 
EPA study the relationship between water allocation and water 
quality.l2II 
2. The Clean Air Act 
The CAA creates a regulatory mechanism to protect air 
quality but does not regulate site-specific pollution through a 
permit program.180 The CAA requires the EPA to designate air 
quality control regions. lSI Primary national ambient air quality 
standards are established by the EPA to protect public health.182 
Secondary standards for any pollutant that may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger the public health are also established.188 
The Act further provides for uniform national standards of per-
127. Section 101(g) provides: 
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to 
allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be 
superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter. 
It is the further policy of Congress that nothing in this chapter 
shall be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quanti-
ties of water which have been established by any State. Fed-
eral agencies shall co-operate with State and local agencies to 
develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce and elimi-
nate pollution in concert with programs for managing water 
resources. 
Clean Water Act § 101 (g), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1982). 
128. Clean Water Act § 102(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (1982). This section provides, in 
part: 
The Administrator, after consultation with the States, and 
River Basin Commissions established under the Water Re-
sources Planning Act shall submit a report to Congress on or 
before July 1, 1978, which analyzes the relationship between 
programs under this chapter, and the programs by which 
State and Federal agencies allocate quantities of water. Such 
report shall include recommendations concerning the policy in 
section 1251(g) of this title to improve coordination of efforts 
to reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for 
managing water resources. 
129. A draft report was issued in 1979 indicating four options were available to ad-
dress water quality relating to reduced stream flows: (1) increased treatment levels; (2) 
limiting diversions and consumptive uses; (3) augmenting stream flows; and (4) relaxing 
water quality standards. EPA DRAFT REPORT, WATER QUALITY/WATER ALLOCATION COOR-
DINATION STUDY (1979). The federal government has not responded to the options 
presented. 
130. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982). 
131. 42 U.S.C. § 7407. 
132. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d). 
133. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2). 
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formance for new stationary sourceslS4 of air pollution,136 and 
emission standards for mobile sources of air pollution,lS8 
The Act requires each statelS7 to submit a State Implemen-
tation Plan to the EPA that implements, maintains, and en-
forces the ambient air quality standards in each air quality con-
trol region,lS8 If the plan meets CAA requirements it will be 
approved by the EP A,ls9 If the plan is inadequate or is not sub-
mitted, the EPA must revise or prepare an adequate implemen-
tation plan for the state,140 
Where regions exceed the mInImUmS imposed by the na-
tional standards, states must impose emission limitations on 
sources created prior to 1971 in order to reach the primary stan-
dards within three years of state plan approval. lU Secondary 
standards must be met within a reasonable time period,142 Areas 
with air quality better than the national standards are subject to 
the "Prevention of Significant Deterioration" regulations,l4s 
Not all pollution emanating from all sources is regulated,l'" 
The CAA only regulates emission sources that the state finds 
threaten national ambient air quality,141i The EPA's regulations 
governing the preparation and content of state plansl48 define 
regulated area sources of pollution to include "miscellaneous 
sources,"147 The Act purports to regulate particulates with an 
134. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(3) defines a stationary source as any building, structure, facil-
ity or installation which emits any air pollution. [d. 
135. 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
136. 42 U.S.C. § 7521. 
137. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) indicates that states have the primary responsibility to 
carry out the Act's mandate. 
138. 42 U.S.C. § 7410. 
139. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(2). 
140. 42 U.S.C. § 741O(c)(1). 
141. 42 U.S.C. § 741O(a)(2)(A). 
142. [d. 
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-91. 
144. See Costle, 666 F.2d at 30. Because not all air pollution sources are regulated, 
(e.g., sources that emit small amounts of pollution) the cumulative effect on air quality 
may not be adequately considered. See Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of 
the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740 (1983). 
145. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D). Unlike the CWA, the CAA does not regulate all point 
sources of pollution. See Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 n.2. 
146. 40 C.F.R. § 51.110(h) (1989). 
147. Id. § 51.100(1). The pre-1986 code, Appendix D, defined miscellaneous sources 
to include fires, coal refuse burning, agricultural burning, and "other" sources. 
17
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aerometric diameter of a nominal 10 microns or lessl48 and fugi-
tive dust149 includes some regulated particulates.lllo 
Before 1987, states with rural fugitive dust areas could dis-
count fugitive dust when developing and enforcing State Imple-
mentation Plans.1II1 When the EPA began regulating particulates 
on July 1, 1987, it categorized areas of the nation into three 
groups.11l2 The Mono Lake area was placed in a group identified 
as an area with a strong likelihood of attaining particulate mat-
ter standards. lila 
Like the CW A, the CAA sets forth citizen suit provisions for 
its legal enforcement. 11l4 Under both acts, the right to other stat-
utory or common law remedies is not limited when enforcement 
is sought. lllll Neither act specifically recognizes or proscribes the 
pursuit of federal common law actions. 
C. FEDERAL DEFERENCE TO STATE WATER LAW 
The federal government defers to the states in the matter of 
water allocation. IllS Western water law is based on the doctrine 
of prior appropriation under which water can be diverted for the 
beneficial use of non appurtenant lands and priority of use is 
based on the chronological order of diversions.11l7 The doctrine 
developed in response to conflicts over insufficient water sup-
plies and the desire to develop the arid west. 11l8 California em-
bedded this doctrine in its state water code.11l9 
148. 40 C.FR § 50.6(c). 
149. Wind storms in the Mono Lake area cause exposed lakebed soil to contribute 
to "fugitive" dust. See supra note 20. 
150. See 52 Fed. Reg. 24,716 (July 1, 1987) (Proposed Policy Statement). 
151. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1202. 
152. [d. This was based on whether an existing state plan might require revision due 
to the new regulation. [d. 
153. [d. 
154. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). 
155. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) and 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). 
156. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) (states can impose condi-
tions on the "control, appropriation, use or distribution of water" in a federal reclama-
tion project if not inconsistent with congressional directives concerning the project). 
157. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 
189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983). 
158. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). 
159. CAL. WATER CODE § 1225 (West Supp. 1990). California also recognizes the ri-
parian rights doctrine which gives owners of property contiguous to a stream the right to 
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California owns title to its navigable waters, and the lands 
beneath it, as trustee for the public.160 This sovereign right in-
cludes the right to control water use and allocations.161 Conse-
quently, California has exercised almost exclusive jurisdiction 
over domestic water use, unhampered by federal interference.162 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY 
1. Federal Common Law Nuisance Action For Water Pollution 
With little discussion, the majority affirmed the lower 
court's ruling that the FWPCA preempted Audubon's common 
law water pollution claim.16s The court reasoned that the Su-
preme Court had unequivocally declaredl64 the FWPCA to be a 
comprehensive statute preempting federal common law nuisance 
water pollution claims.1611 
2. Federal Common Law Nuisance Action For Air Pollution 
The majority determined that Audubon could not properly 
assert a federal common law nuisance action based on air pollu-
tion. 166 The majority analyzed whether Audubon's nuisance ac-
tion came within the "few and restricted" instances in which 
federal courts are authorized to fashion federal common law.167 
reasonable and beneficial use of water on their land. See National Audubon Soc'y v. 
Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 441. 
160. See City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. 
Rptr. 327 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980). 
161. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 at 657-58 (1978). 
162. [d. The federal government holds implied reserved water rights for use on fed-
erallands. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (water rights for national 
parks and monuments); see also, Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (water 
rights for Indian reservation). 
163. National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water, 869 F.2d at 1200 (9th Cir. 
1989). 
164. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 
U.S. 1 (1981). 
165. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200. Quoting Sea Clammers the majority 
found, " 'the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely 
preempted by the more comprehensive scope of the FWPCA, which was completely re-
vised after the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee.' " [citations omitted]". [d. 
166. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200. 
167. [d. at 1201, (citing Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 
630, 640 (1980) (federal courts not empowered to fashion a federal common law rule of 
19
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The court categorized these circumscribed instances as those in 
which a federal rule of decision is required to protect uniquely 
federal interests or those in which Congress has given the courts 
power to develop substantive law. lOS 
a. Courts Not Empowered to Create Substantive Air Pollution 
Law 
The majority found the CAA to be a comprehensive stat-
ute.10S The court reviewed the Act's provisions setting forth na-
tional standards noting two sections170 govern the establishment 
and revision of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS).l71 As Congress revised the standards for particulate 
pollution172 the majority found the Mono Lake area probably 
had an adequate control strategy.l78 
The majority concluded the Act empowers only the EPA to 
identify dangerous or potentially dangerous pollutants and con-
centration levels.174 It also noted the Act requires states to de-
velop plans to implement, maintain, and enforce those stan-
dards.l7II Consequently, the majority determined Congress did 
not authorize the courts to develop a substantive common law 
for air pollution. l7O 
b. Federal Common Law Unnecessary to Protect Uniquely 
Federal Interest 
The majority found that a uniquely federal interest war-
ranting the creation of federal commpn law exists only in narrow 
contribution among antitrust wrongdoers». 
168. Id. at 1201 (citing Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 640). 
169. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1201. 
170. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(1)(A) directs the EPA Administrator to identify pollutants 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare and to issue 
air quality criteria for them. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 directs the Administrator to propose and 
promulgate "primary" and "secondary" National Ambient Air Quality Standards for pol-
lutants identified under the former section. 
171. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1201-02. See supra notes 131-36 and accom-
panying text. 
172. Id. at 1202. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text. 
173. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1202. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
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circumstances; in this type of case it would be limited to situa-
tions in which the rights and obligations of the United States 
are involved or where there is an interstate dispute implicating 
the conflicting rights of states.177 Audubon argued a significant 
federal interest existed in the Mono Lake area air quality in part 
because Mono Lake is proximate to federal lands.178 
. The majority found Congress recognized "some" limited 
federal interest in national air quality by enacting the CAA.179 
However, as the Act reserved to the state primary responsibility 
for air quality it concluded180 there is not "a uniquely federal 
interest" in protecting the nation's air quality.l8l Moreover, to 
the extent that there is a general federal interest in air quality, 
Audubon failed to demonstrate that state law was inadequate or 
in conflict with federal policy or interests.182 Thus, no rights or 
obligations of the United States warranted creation of federal 
common law. 
Nor did the majority find this claim involved the kind of 
interstate dispute that required resolution under federal law.18s 
Relying on two Supreme Court holdings, Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper CO.184 and Milwaukee 1,186 the majority explained that 
the Court had extended federal law only to those interstate con-
troversies which involve a state suing sources outside of its own 
territory.18s As Aubudon was a domestic dispute, involving pol-
177. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1202. The majority relied on Texas Industries 
v. Radcliffe Materials, 451 U.S. 630 (1980). 
178. Appellant's Opening Brief at 15, National Aububon Soc'y v. Department of 
Water, 869 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 85-2046). 
179. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1203. 
180. [d. 
181. [d. at 1204. To reinforce its analysis the court added, "[a)lthough there might 
arguably be some unquantified federal interest ... this ... does not necessarily involve 
the authority and duties of the United States as sovereign to the extent that our federal 
system requires that the controversy be resolved under federal law to the exclusion of 
state law." [d. (emphasis in original). Hence, state law applied as the alleged federal 
policies or interests and a state common law nuisance action did not conflict. [d. 
182. [d. at 1203-04. 
183. [d. at 1204-05. 
184. 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
185. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text. 
186. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1205. "It appears that the Court considers only 
those interstate controversies which involve a state suing sources outside of its own terri-
tory because they are causing pollution within the state to be inappropriate for state law 
to control, and therefore subject to resolution according to federal common law." [d. 
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lution from a California source, the majority found it was not a 
"true" interstate controversy for which state law is not 
appropriate.187 
B. DISSENT 
1. There Is a Federal Interest 
Judge Reinhardt, dissenting, argued the majority erred in 
assuming that a "uniquely federal interest" could be implicated 
only where there was a "right or obligation of the United States" 
or an "interstate dispute implicating the conflicting rights of 
states."188 He reasoned the Supreme Court in Milwaukee I 
found air quality to be a matter of uniquely federal interest189 
and, absent a preemptive federal statute, federal courts are em-
powered to decide federal common law nuisance actions.19o As 
the majority did not adequately distinguish Audubon from Mil-
waukee I, Judge Reinhardt argued its lead should be followed. 19l 
Further, Judge Reinhardt maintained the CAA provisions 
demonstrated there "was a uniquely federal interest in air qual-
ity".192 He urged that the CAA was similar to the pre-amended 
187. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1205. Because it did not recognize the federal 
common law claim, the court did not decide whether the CAA would have preempted it, 
or whether Audubon had standing to sue. 
188. National Audubon, 869 F.2d 1196, 1207 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
189. Id. The fact that air quality is a matter of uniquely federal interest suffices for 
invoking the federal common law of nuisance. Id. Judge Reinhardt relied on the Su-
preme Court decision in Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
190. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1207. " '[FJederal courts will be empowered to 
appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance' .... " Id. (quot-
ing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 at 107). The federal interest established in 
Milwaukee I was not affected by Milwaukee II. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1207. 
Judge Reinhardt noted the later decision specifically dealt with preemption of the water 
pollution claim due to the 1972 FWPCA amendments. Id. 
191. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1207-08. Judge Reinhardt noted the majority 
did not contend Congress occupied the field with respect to air pollution but rather de-
clared there is no "federal interest" in air pollution. Id. He observed that while Milwau-
kee I involved water pollution and not air pollution, the Supreme Court relied on both to 
support finding federal common law governed the need for a uniform rule of decision. Id. 
The majority's apparent belief there was a uniquely federal interest in preserving the 
nation's waters but not the purity of its air was ungrounded. Id. at 1208. Further, the 
dissent faulted the majority for not revealing why water should be subject to uniform 
federal law but air subject to a "patchwork of state rules." Id. 
192. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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FWPCA effective at the time of Milwaukee 1,193 and evidenced 
as much a federal interest in protecting air quality as did the 
FWPCA in protecting water quality before the 1972 
amendments.19' 
2. Interstate Pollution Not Required 
Judge Reinhardt determined interstate pollution was not 
prerequisite to state a claim because a federal interest was im-
plicated.1911 He asserted the federal interest in clean air and 
water is unaffected by state boundaries. 19G 
193. Id. at 1208-09. "For example, for those types of pollutants regulated by the 
CAA, it is the federal government, not the states, that establishes national air quality 
standards." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7409). Judge Reinhardt compared this to Milwaukee I, 
where under the FWPCA if a state fails to establish water quality standards the EPA 
administrator promulgates one. [d. 
Also, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) regulates air pollutants emitted by mobile and 
stationary sources that "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or wel-
fare." Id. Comparatively, water pollution under the pre-amended FWPCA could be 
abated when it endangered public health or welfare. National Audubon, 869 F.2d 1208. 
Finally, "the [CAA) authorizes the [EPA Administrator) to bring civil actions for non-
compliance with the Act [citations omitted) [and) under the FWPCA the Attorney Gen-
eral may bring suit on behalf of the U.S. for abatement of pollution." [d. (citing Milwau-
kee I, 406 U.S. at 103). 
The dissent concluded that just as the FWPCA evidenced a uniquely federal interest 
in water pollution, the CAA evidenced a similar federal interest in air pollution. Id. at 
1208. As Congress has approved additional legislation in this area (reauthorizing and 
amending the CAA and CW A and enacting the Coastal Zone Management Act, and the 
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act) the federal interest in clean air and 
water has become even more apparent since Milwaukee I. [d. at 1208 n.3. 
194. Id. at 1209. The majority found nothing in the CAA suggested Congress in-
tended to rely upon a federal common law remedy for the Act's enforcement. The dissent 
concluded that was irrelevant to whether a federal interest was involved. Id. 
195. Id. Judge Reinhardt's interpretation is based on language in Milwaukee 1 in 
which the Court held federal law " 'controls the pollution of interstate or navigable wa-
ters' and federal common law governs 'air and water in their ambient or interstate as-
pects.' " Id. (citing Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 102-03). 
196. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1209. This was the Seventh Circuit's view in 
Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded 
on other grounds, 453 U.S. 917 (1981). There, the court stressed, "The Court's use of the' 
term 'navigable waters' (in Milwaukee l) significantly suggests the breadth of the hold-
ing, for that term includes both the territorial seas and purely intrastate waters having 
no necessary interstate impact." Outboard Marine, 619 F.2d at 626-27. The Seventh Cir-
cuit declared the need for uniform rules of decision is equally strong whether or not the 
pollution has interstate effects. Id. at 628. See also National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City 
of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1234 n.35 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on grounds of preemption 
sub nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 
(1981). 
23
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As to the majority's finding that the controversy was 
"purely domestic," Judge Reinhardt countered this was really an 
isaue related to standing. IS? 
3. Standing 
Judge Reinhardt contended the majority confused the issue 
of claim permissibility with the issue of standing.ls8 While the 
Supreme Court has not expressly decided whether a private 
plaintiff may bring a federal common law nuisance action, Mil-
waukee I suggested that a state complainant was not required. ISS 
He found it significant that both acts provided for private 
enforcement200 and reasoned that because private parties may 
seek a remedy for statutorily prohibited pollution, they may also 
seek remedies against pollution not addressed by the statutes.201 
Therefore, Judge Reinhardt concluded that the arguments weigh 
in favor of allowing Audubon to pursue its claim.202 
4. Preemption by Clean Air Act 
Although the majority did not address the issue, Judge 
Reinhardt found that the CAA did not preempt Audubon's 
197. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1210. Even if interstate pollution were reo 
quired, Audubon would meet the test because it alleged the dust polluted Nevada's air as 
well as California's. [d. at 1209·10 n.5. 
198. [d. at 1210. The opinion noted the majority did not cite authority for limiting 
standing to states as parties, but rather, cited cases in which the state was a party. [d. 
199. [d. " '[I)t is not only the character of the parties that requires us to apply fed· 
eral.Jaw.' [Milwaukee l] 406 U.S. at 105 n.6. Rather ... federal common law applies 
'where there is an overriding federal interest ... or where the controversy touches basic 
interests of federalism.' " [citation omitted). National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1210. 
Judge Reinhardt noted that in National Sea Clammers, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 
1980) the Third Circuit squarely held private parties may file federal common law nui· 
sance actions. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1210. 
200. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1210·11. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365; 42 U.S.C. § 7604. 
201. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1211. Judge Reinhardt added that federal com· 
mon law remedies, albeit not in the nuisance context, have been held available to private 
plaintiffs, citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 
(1938). See also, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). According 
to Judge Reinhardt there was neither supporting authority nor rationale to deviate from 
the general rule that federal common law remedies are available to private parties. It was 
noted the majority provided no reason beyond the fact the Supreme Court has not had 
occasion to decide the question in a nuisance context. [d. at 1211. 
202. [d. 
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claim.203 Relying on Milwaukee II's preemption analysis, he de-
clared that the statute must speak directly to the question in 
order to preempt common law .. The CW A preempted feder.al 
common law because it was "an all-encompassing program of 
water pollution regulation."20. 
Unlike the CW A, the CAA does not regulate emissions from 
every source, but only from those sources found to threaten 
EPA promulgated air quality standards.2011 Accordingly, Judge 
Reinhardt determined the CAA allows federal courts "to im-
prove on [its] program with federal common law," as did the 
pre-amended FWPCA.206 
V. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit's determination that Audubon could not 
assert a federal common law nuisance claim based on air pollu-
tion was the heart of its decision.207 However, it is disturbing 
that Audubon's federal water pollution claim was so quickly re-
jected by the majority. The Ninth Circuit may have had no 
choice but to find preemption in light of Supreme Court prece-
dent although this case exemplifies why the Court itself, may 
have been too hasty in concluding the nuisance doctrine 
extinguished. 
According to Audubon, the Mono Lake diversions were not 
subject to a NPDES permit208 and the FWPCA did not apply,209 
203. [d. at 1212. 
204. [d. (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 318). 
205. [d. at 1212-13 (relying on New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 
n.2 (2d. Cir. 1981». Further, Congress has not amended the CAA to provide for a com-
prehensive regulatory scheme as it did for the CWA in 1972. [d. The CAA, like the old 
FWPCA, focuses on establishing parameters for tolerable levels of pollutants in the envi-
ronment, while the CWA focuses on regulating all discharge of pollutants. [d. at 1213. 
206. [d. (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 319). Furthermore, the fact the EPA regu-
lates wind-borne air pollution was insufficient to conclude the Act preempts federal com-
mon law. [d. at 1214. The old FWPCA also regulated the type of pollution which the 
plaintiff in Milwaukee [ sought to have abated. But, because the remedy sought was "not 
within the precise scope" of those included in the FWPCA, and because the FWPCA was 
not all-encompassing, the Supreme Court concluded the federal common law of nuisance 
still applied. [d. at 1214. 
207. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1204. 
208. Appellant's Opening Brief at 11, National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of 
Water, 869 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 85-2046). Because there was no point source 
discharge, CW A permit requirements were not triggered. See supra notes 112-17 and 
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making a federal statutory remedy unavailable.2lo The Ninth 
Circuit did not review the distinctions Audubon raised but re-
sponded summarily that the FWPCA preempted Audubon's 
water pollution nuisance claim211 based on the Supreme Court's 
highly criticized opinion in Sea Clammers.m 
The majority's approach indicates an unquestioned accept-
ance and liberal application of the broad scope of preemption 
that the Supreme Court set forth in Milwaukee II upon which 
Sea Clammers relied.218 Unlike the instant case, however, Mil-
waukee II and Sea Clammers involved point-source pollution 
caused by a NPDES permitted discharge,2U thus the CW A 
applied.2ui 
A fair argument could be made that Audubon's water pollu-
tion claim was not preempted for much the same reason that the 
claim in Milwaukee I was not preempted.lIls As the Act did not 
address the issue under review there could be no preemption.217 
The Ninth Circuit's opinion suggests the end of the federal com-
accompanying text. 
209. Appellant's Opening Brief at 11-12. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(0 considers salt water in-
trusion resulting from fresh water flow reduction to be a non-point source pollutant al-
though the CWA does not appear to provide an effective remedy. It merely provides for 
identification and evaluation of non-point pollution sources with pollution control meth-
ods to be developed at a later date. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(0. However, Mono Lake's alleged 
diversion-created saline environment was not akin to salt water intrusion. See supra 
note 36. Consequently, it appears the CW A does not address the instant case. 
210. Appellant's Opening Brief at 11-12. Citing United States u. Little Lake Misere 
Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973), Audubon argued the Supreme Court has allowed 
"interstitial federal lawmaking" where a statute fails to provide a remedy. Appellant's 
Opening Brief at 34. 
211. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200. 
212. Id. See Note, The Hazardous Waste Regulatory Programs and the Federal 
Common Law of Nuisance: A Confusion Between Preemption and Codification, 45 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 791, at 802 n.120 for criticism of this approach. Also, National Audubon, 869 
F.2d at 1212 n.10, Reinhardt, J., dissenting, indicates the Sea Clammers holding seems 
to extend beyond the Milwaukee II holding. 
213. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. It has been observed that lower 
courts seem inclined to "broadly" apply the preemption doctrine despite extensive criti-
cism of the Milwaukee II and Sea Clammers holdings. See supra note 212. 
214. The Supreme Court has never expressly dealt with a federal common law nui-
sance water pollution issue except where the discharge has been subject to a NPDES 
permit. An exception is Milwaukee I, the parent of Milwaukee II, which was prior to the 
NPDES permit requirement. 
215. See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text. 
216. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
217. SeeId. 
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mon law nuisance action based on water pollution, regardless of 
the adequacy of the remedy provided by the FWPCA. 
Although the majority's conclusion regarding water pollu-
tion is understandable in view of recent Supreme Court pro-
nouncements, its treatment of the air pollution claim cannot be 
so easily forgiven despite the intuitive correctness of the holding. 
The court's analysis of the air pollution claim is intrinsically 'pe-
culiar because the air pollution claim was determined not to be a 
matter of federal interest.218 In contrast, the water pollution 
claim was found to be a matter of federal interest, subject to 
federal statutory law.219 
The distinction the majority seems to have made between 
water and air pollution actions is tenuous but noteworthy. The 
fact the majority recognized there might be some federal com-
mon law air pollution claims with the requisite federal interest is 
encouraging because the CAA does not effectively regulate all air 
pollution, just as the pre-1972 FWPCA did not regulate all water 
pollution. 
However, Mono Lake's air pollution was not found to be a 
matter of uniquely federal interest,220 which seems inconsistent 
with the majority's reliance on a national standard221 imple-
mented by a federal agency222 to conclude Congress did not em-
power it to enforce the CAA.223 As the dissenting opinion noted, 
the Supreme Court in Milwaukee I determined air quality was a 
matter of uniquely federal interest.224 The subsequent holding in 
Milwaukee II did not alter that determination,2211 so it is difficult 
218. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1203. The Supreme Court in Milwaukee [ 
found there is federal common law when dealing with air and water in their ambient or 
interstate aspects. However, the Ninth Circuit majority interpreted Milwaukee [ as find· 
ing that there is no federal common law for rural fugitive dust. [d. 
219. This inconsistency was noted by Judge Reinhardt, dissenting. National Audu· 
bon, 869 F.2d at 1207·08. 
220. [d. at 1204. 
221. Some particulate matter contained within fugitive dust, such as Mono Lake's 
. dust, is regulated by the CAA. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1202. 
222. [d. 
223. [d. at 1201·02. 
224. Milwaukee [, 406 U.S. at 103. The majority believed the Court's statement was 
made in the context of water pollution and dust pollution was not addressed. National 
Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1203. 
225. Milwaukee II only dealt with the specific facts of the case, that is, whether the 
CW A applied to a discharge subject to a NPDES permit. 
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to understand why a federal interest was not found especially as 
the CAA provides that air quality is a national concern.226 If na-
tional interests were significant enough for Congress to enact a 
federal statute then it follows that a federal interest must 
exist.227 
Clearly, the Ninth Circuit majority thought the Mono Lake 
controversy should be decided by the state courts.228 It is also 
clear that Audubon's air pollution claim was distinctly inciden-
tal to the water pollution claim with the principal goal being to 
reduce or stop the diversions. The majority, albeit unexpressly, 
may have identified this case as potentially raising a water rights 
issue. 
If the Ninth Circuit had permitted the claim it would have 
had to decide what law to apply - federal law or state law. Ap-
plication of federal law would have plainly interfered with the 
state's right to allocate its water as necessary. Therefore, to hold 
otherwise, the court would have ignored Congress's expressed 
prohibition that the CW A cannot interfere with state water allo-
cations229 and would have set the scene for federal interference 
in an area historically relegated to the state.280 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although reinforcing the demise of federal common law nui-
sance actions for water pollution, the majority declined to nullify 
federal common law nuisance actions for air pollution. If a 
unique federal interest is found and the CAA does not provide a 
remedy, federal common law may still be applicable. 
The Ninth Circuit's decision was correct because a decision 
for Audubon would have seriously disturbed state water policy. 
A successful federal common law action would have meddled 
226. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b). 
227. Significantly, the Ninth Circuit did not find preemption of the air pollution 
claim which indirectly seems to agree with the Milwaukee I holding, that is, if there is a 
statutory gap and it is necessary to protect a federal interest, federal common law may 
be applicable. However, in the instant case a true federal interest was not found. 
228. See National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1204. 
229. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g). 
230. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text. 
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with the state's historic right to allocate its water as needed, a 
major federal interference inconsistent with judicial precedent 
and the CWA. 
Although this case was an environmental defeat, the ex-
haustive battle to save Mono Lake has finally been won given 
recent state legislation231 and court decisions232 which will allevi-
ate the water diversion created problems plaguing the lake. 
Beverly Saxon· 
231. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. 
232. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1990. 
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